Emanuela Tangari
Emanuela Tangari holds a PhD in Moral Philosophy from University of Rome Tor Vergata, where she is currently adjunct professor of Philosophy of Technique at the Course of Computer Engineering of the University of Rome Tor Vergata and of Philosophical Anthropology at the Department of Literary, Philosophical and Art History Studies of the same University. She spent periods of study in Paris (Collège de France) and Toulouse (IC). She collaborated in developing of writing system Potest.org (user interface, extensions). She is editor of the philosophical journal Dialegesthai, member of the Editorial board of the European Society for Moral Philosophy, member of the Research Team Métaphysique, histoire, concepts, actualité at the Catholique Institute of Toulouse and director of the cultural Association MondoDomani. She is a member of the steering committee of the degree course in Electronic Engineering at the University of Rome Tor Vergata. Her research focuses on the themes of 20th century metaphysics and philosophical anthropology, the philosophical foundations of technology and the ethical, social, psychological and pedagogical implications of new technologies
Session
Self-Sovereign Identity promises a different way of proving who we are online: instead of relying on a central identity provider, users can hold verifiable credentials and decide what information to disclose.
But how much information do we really need to reveal to prove something about ourselves?
In many digital interactions, a verifier does not need to know our full identity. It may only need to know whether we are over 18, authorised to access a service, hold a valid qualification, or possess a non-revoked credential.
This talk explores how selective disclosure, Zero-Knowledge Proofs and cryptographic accumulators can support a shift from identity disclosure to proof-based verification. Instead of transferring personal data and protecting it afterwards, users can prove that a requirement is satisfied without revealing the underlying information.
Using scenarios inspired by the TRUSTED project, we discuss data minimisation, unlinkability, credential validity and revocation. We also look beyond cryptography itself: even privacy-preserving credentials can still enable correlation, metadata leakage or unnecessary identification if the wider identity flow is poorly designed.
The key question is therefore not only “Can I prove who I am?”, but “Can I prove what you need to know without telling you who I am?”